Folk Theorem with Communication by Ichiro Obara
Folk Theorem with Communication1
Ichiro Obara
Department of Economics
University of Minnesota and University of California Los Angeles
First Version August 5, 2005
This version February 7, 2008
1I am grateful to the associate editor, an anonymous referee, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan,
Michihiro Kandori, and George Mailath for their helpful comments. I also thank the seminar
participants at 2005 SAET conference at Vigo and University of Southern California.Abstract
This paper proves a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring
and communication, extending the idea of delayed communication in Compte [6] to
t h ec a s ew h e r ep r i v a t es i g n a l sa r ec o r r e l a t e d .
The suﬃcient condition for the folk theorem is generically satisﬁed with more
than two players, even when other well-known conditions are not. The folk theorem
also applies to some two-players repeated games.
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JEL classiﬁcation codes: C72, C73, D821I n t r o d u c t i o n
We have observed a signiﬁcant progress in repeated games with private monitoring
i nt h el a s tf e wy e a r s . I ts t a r t e dw i t has e r i e so fp a p e r sw h i c hp r o v e daf o l kt h e o -
rem with communication, such as Ben-Porath and Kahneman [4], Compte [6], and
Kandori and Matsushima [11]. They are very important contributions to the theory
of long term relationships, especially because repeated games with private moni-
toring are very diﬃcult to analyze without communication. These folk theorems,
however, do not cover all the interesting cases because of the speciﬁc assumptions
they require on private monitoring structure. This note proves a new folk theorem
with communication to expand the range of environments to which the folk theorem
applies.
The main contribution of this note is to extend the idea of delayed communi-
cation in Compte [6] to the case where private signals are correlated. Compte [6]
focuses on T−public equilibria in which players play the same action for T periods
and announce their accumulated private signals truthfully only every T periods.
These private signals in each T-period block are used to “test” whether each player
has deviated or not within the same block. A player is punished at the end of the
block with a lower continuation payoﬀ when the private signals reported by the
other players look “bad”. In conducting this statistical test, it is important that a
player does not learn the likelihood of her punishment from her own private signals.
If she is conﬁdent that she will not be punished in the end of a T-period block, she
may start deviating toward the end of the block. Compte [6] avoids this problem
by assuming conditional independence between players’ private signals. However,
conditional independence is a nongeneric assumption.1 Furthermore, it is diﬃcult
to introduce even a slight correlation of private signals. This is because T must go
to inﬁnity to obtain the exact folk theorem, hence players may be able to obtain
a large amount of information from their accumulated private signals even if each
signal has a limited information.2
This note proposes a new condition which serves the same purpose as conditional
independence, thus making it possible to apply the idea of delayed communication
even when private signals are correlated. The condition is generically satisﬁed for
most of stage games when the number of players is more than two. When the number
of actions and signals is the same across players, this condition is generically satisﬁed
even more easily than the suﬃcient condition proposed by Kandori and Matsushima
[11].
There are a few recent contributions proving folk theorems for repeated games
with private monitoring and communication. They pay extra attention to the case
with two players: the case that was not extensively analyzed in the initial contribu-
1Compte [6] does allow for some correlation of private signals oﬀ the equilibrium path.
2As observed by Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce [1], this type of statistical test becomes more
eﬀective as T becomes large. In fact, the cost of expected punishment converges to 0 as T goes to
inﬁnity and players become inﬁnitely patient.
1tions.3 Fudenberg and Levine [9] proves a Nash-threat folk theorem when players’
private signals are highly correlated. Ashkenazi-Golan [2] assumes that deviations
are perfectly observable by at least one player with positive probability and proves a
Nash-threat folk theorem. These results, as well as the result of this note, apply to
repeated games with two or more players. Finally, McLean, Obara and Postlewaite
[15] proves a folk theorem when private signals are correlated and can be treated
like a public signal once aggregated. But this result requires at least three players.
I also should mention that many folk theorem results without communication
have been obtained recently. However, most of them assume almost perfect moni-
toring (Bhaskar and Obara [5], Ely and V¨ alim¨ aki [7], H¨ orner and Olszewski [10], and
Mailath and Morris [12]).4 One exception is Matsushima [14] that allows for noisy
private monitoring. However he assumes a certain type of conditional independence
of private signals as in Compte [6]. The result of this note may be useful to deal
with noisy correlated private signals even without communication, but that is left
for future research.
The next section presents the model brieﬂy. Section 3 introduces the assumptions
on monitoring structure. Section 4 presents the main result and Section 5 discusses
some extension.
2M o d e l
Stage game G =( I,A,g)i sd e ﬁned as follows. The set of players is I = {1,2,...,n},n≥
2. In each period, player i ∈ I chooses an action from a ﬁnite action set Ai (simul-
taneously with the other players) and observes a private signal si from a ﬁnite
set Si.B o t h ai and si are private information, observable only to player i. Let
p(s|a) be the probability of s ∈ S =
Qn
i=1 Si given a ∈ A =
Qn
i=1 Ai. It is as-
sumed that p(s|a) has full support on S for every a ∈ A. The signal distribution
on S−i = Πj6=iSj for player i given a ∈ A (and si ∈ Si) is denoted by p−i (s−i|a)
(p−i (s−i|a,si)). Player i’s (expected) stage game payoﬀ gi : A → < is given by
gi (a)=
P
ui (ai,s i)p(s|a)w h e r eui : Ai × Si → < is a realized payoﬀ of player
i. Let g(a)=( g1 (a),...,g n (a)) be the expected payoﬀ proﬁle given a ∈ A and
V = co{g(a)|a ∈ A} ⊂ <n be the feasible payoﬀ set.5 Abusing notations slightly,
let gi (α)b ep l a y e ri’s expected stage game payoﬀ g i v e nam i x e da c t i o np r o ﬁle
α ∈
Qn
i=1 4Ai and g(α)=( g1 (α),...,g n (α)). The set of Nash equilibrium proﬁles
is denoted by NE ⊂
Qn
i=1 4Ai. Let V NE = co{v ∈ V | ∃α ∈ NE s.t.v> >g(α)}.
This stage game G is played repeatedly over time. In the end of each period,
players send messages m =( m1,...,m n) ∈ M =
Qn
i=1 Mi simultaneously, which
3However, Theorem 2 in Compte [6] applies to two-player games. Kandori and Matsushima [11]
spends one section to prove a folk theorm for the repeated prisoners’ dilemma game with conditional
independence and private monitoring.
4Also see Mailath and Morris [13]
5For any X ⊂ <
n,c o Xis the convex-hull of X.
2are publicly observed. Private history and public history at period t =1 ,2.. are
ht
i =( ai,1,s i,1,...,a i,t−1,s i,t−1) ∈ (Ai × Si)
t−1 ,i ∈ I and ht =( m1,...,m t−1) ∈
Mt−1 respectively.6 Player i’s strategy σi consists of an action strategy σa
i and a
report strategy σm
i . Player i’s action strategy σa
i is a collection of period t behavior
strategies (σa




into Ai. Player i’s report strategy
σm
i is a collection of period t behavior strategies (σm
i,t,t=1 ,2,...,), which map ¡
ht+1
i ,h t¢
into Mi. They also depend on a realization of a randomization device.
But I avoid introducing additional notations here to simplify the exposition. It will
be mentioned when the public randomization device is introduced.7
The players discount their future payoﬀs by common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1).







3 Assumptions on Monitoring Structure
I introduce and discuss a few important conditions in this section. First, it is
assumed that player i0s deviation is statistically detectable from private signals of
the other players. For given a ∈ A, let Qi (a) be the convex-hull of probability vectors n
p−i (·|a0





. Then this assumption can be formally stated as
follows.
Assumption 1
p−i (·|a) / ∈ Qi (a)f o re v e r ya ∈ A and i ∈ I.
This assumption is standard. In Kandori and Matsushima [11], it is implied
by assumption (A2). In Compte [6], this is satisﬁed when there exists an unbiased
monitor for each player.
As is well known, this guarantees that ai ∈ Ai is strictly enforceable through
transfers contingent on s−i.
Lemma 1 Assumption 1 is satisﬁed at a ∈ A for i ∈ I if and only if there exists













The next condition is the key for the folk theorem. Fix a ∈ A and si ∈ Si and
consider all the conditional beliefs on S−i when player i observes a diﬀerent signal or
6I follow the convention and set h
t
i = h
t = ∅ in t =1 .
7It is possible to generate any public randomization device endogenously through (direct) com-
munication by redeﬁning i’s message space as Mi×[0,1] for each i ∈ I and using a jointly-controlled
lottery (Aumann, Maschler and Stearns [3]).









i) 6=( ai,s i)
o
.
Deﬁnition 1 Player i is an informed player at a ∈ A if
p−i (·|a,si) / ∈ Ri (a,si)for any si ∈ Si (IP)
When player i is informed at a, her conditional belief given any private signal is
not a linear combination of her conditional beliefs given diﬀerent signals or unilateral






,A i = {C,D}, and I = {1,2}. P l a y e r1i sa ni n f o r m e dp l a y e r
at (C,C) if and only if (after relabeling y2 and y2 if necessary)




























Note that player 1 cannot be an informed player at (D,C) when she is informed at
(C,C).8
This condition is satisﬁed in the following example. Suppose that there is a hid-




. Each player’s private signal si,i=1 ,2 is a noisy conditionally
independent observation of y.P l a y e r i’s private signal si is correct (yi for y and
yi for y) with probability 1 − ε0 when ai = C and correct with probability 1 − ε00
when ai = D. Assume also that ε0 < ε00 < 1/2. That is, player i0sp r i v a t es i g n a l
is more informative when C is chosen. When ε0










Thus player 1 (and player 2, too) is an informed player at (C,C). Note that player
1i sa l s oi n f o r m e da t( C,D).
A few remarks are in order. First, player i’s private signal given a ∈ A must be
correlated with the other players’ private signals when she is informed at a.I fp r i -
vate signals are conditionally independent, then p−i (·|a,si) does not depend on si.
Hence this condition is complementary to the independence assumption in Compte
[6]. Second, (IP) is very easily satisﬁed with three players or more. Indeed it is gener-
ically satisﬁed for every player at every action proﬁle when |Ai|×| Si| ≤
Q
j6=i |Sj|,
i ∈ I (with |Sj| ≥ 2 for every j ∈ I) because {p−i (·|a,si):ai ∈ Ai,s i ∈ Si} are
generically linearly independent in that case. Kandori and Matsushima [11]’s con-
dition also holds generically with three players or more. To compare my result to
8If there are at least three signals for player 2, then there are monitoring structures for which
player 1 is informed at all action proﬁles.
4theirs, consider a stage game with m = |Ai| and K = |Si| for all i ∈ I. Kandori and
Matsushima [11] requires |Ai| + |Aj| − 1 ≤ |S−i,j| for every i,j for their condition
to be satisﬁed generically, which reduces to 2m − 1 ≤ Kn−2, whereas the above in-
equality reduces to a weaker condition: m ≤ Kn−2. Third, (IP) is less easily satisﬁed
with two players. Indeed |A1|×|S1| ≤ |S2| and |A2|×|S2| ≤ |S1| cannot be satisﬁed
at the same time, thus there must exist some action proﬁl ew h e r es o m ep l a y e ri sn o t
informed. However, my folk theorem may still hold even in such cases because (1)
some action proﬁles are not relevant for the proof of the folk theorem and (2) not all
p l a y e r sh a v et ob ei n f o r m e d .Ij u s tn e e do n ep l a y e rt ob ei n f o r m e da tr e l e v a n ta c t i o n
proﬁles. The last section discusses the possibility to relax the suﬃcient condition
regarding informed players even further. Finally, this condition does not presume
any type of almost public monitoring or almost common knowledge (Fudenberg and
Levine [9], Mailath and Morris [12], and McLean, Obara and Postlewaite [?]).
The crucial step of the proof is to construct a binary signal for player i from
reported signal proﬁles, which is used to punish her when she deviates in action
and/or in announcements. The binary signal has the following two properties: (1)
it is informative about player i’s action and message and (2) player i does not
update her belief about the signal based on her private signal si in equilibrium, i.e.
her private signal is not informative about whether she will be punished or not. To
be more precise, let me introduce the following condition.
Deﬁnition 2. Player i can be secretly screened at a ∈ A if there exists qi : S →
[0,1] such that







i 6= ai or ρ : Si → Siis not the identity function, and
E [qi (s)|a]=E [qi (s)|a,si]for all si ∈ Si (2)
This qi can be interpreted as the probability of the “bad” outcome of the binary
signal. The ﬁrst condition means that the probability of a bad outcome goes up when
player i either deviates from ai or sends a false message. The second condition means
that the expected value of qi is unaﬀected by player i’s private information when
she plays ai and announces her signal truthfully. The following key lemma proves
that (IP) holds at a ∈ A if and only if player i can be secretly screened at a ∈ A.
Lemma 2 Player i is an informed player at a ∈ A if and only if player i can be
secretly screened at a ∈ A.
Proof. Suppose that player i is an informed player at a ∈ A. By the hyperplane
theorem, there exists qi : S → < to satisfy
X
s−i



















6=( ai,s i)a n df o ra l lsi ∈ Si.
5Without loss of generality, I can choose qi (s)s ot h a tE [qi (s)|a,si]=π for all si for
some π ∈ (0,1) (add some appropriate constant to qi (s)f o re a c hsi). Furthermore,
qi (s) can be chosen from (0,1) for all s ∈ S. If not, then redeﬁne qi (s)a se qi (s)=
(qi (s)+zπ) 1
z+1 for some large z>0. Then this e qi (s)s t i l ls a t i s ﬁes all the strict
inequalities and lies in (0,1) if z is large enough.










The above strict inequalities imply that
P
s−i qi (ρ(si),s −i)pi (s−i|(a0
i,a −i),s i)i s
strictly larger than π when either a0
i 6= ai or si 6= ρ(si). This implies that (1) holds
when either a0























= E [qi (s)|a].
Conversely, suppose that player i can be secretly screened at a ∈ A. Then, for


























i) ∈ Ai × Si
o
,
which implies that p−i (·|a,si) / ∈ Ri (a,si).
The key condition for the main result is (2). Compte [6] uses a similar binary
signal for which qi does not depend on si. In this case, no learning ((2)) follows
automatically from conditional independence, (IP) can be regarded as an alternative,
possibly generic, condition, which guarantees that (2) is satisﬁed for some qi even
when private signals are correlated.
T h eR o l eo fI n f o r m e dP l a y e r s
Since (1) and (2) are central to the proof of the folk theorem, it may be useful
to explain their roles in the formal proof of the folk theorem.
6As is often the case, for each utility weight λ ∈ <n, I try to support a ∈ A that
maximizes λ · g (a) while minimizing “eﬃciency losses” of continuation payoﬀs( i n
the direction of λ).
Suppose that player i is informed at a ∈ A and λi > 0. The incentive of player
j 6= i is provided through transfers xj (s−j)( b yL e m m a1 )p e r i o db yp e r i o d .N o t e
that player j’s revelation constraints are satisﬁed by deﬁnition because xj does not
depend on sj.T oa v o i de ﬃciency losses, −
λj
λixj (s−j) is added to player i’s transfer.





Note that this creates an incentive problem for player i because she may have in-
centive to misrepresent her signal to control the transfers from j. This problem can
be taken care of by using qi as explained below. This is another reason (in addition
to “no learning”) why it is useful to make qi dependent on si in addition to s−i.
Compte [6] avoids this problem by making xj(s−i,j) independent of si, but this does
not allow the case with two players.
Player i’s incentive is provided through punishments. This is where (1) is used.
The probability of a bad signal, hence the probability of punishment, increases when
the distribution of s−i suggested by player i’s message does not match with the
true distribution of s−i.9 This punishment is costly because it occurs with positive
probability (and λi > 0). To reduce the expected cost of punishments, private
signals are stored and revealed only in every T periods. The eﬃciency of monitoring
is improved by using such accumulated private signals. Indeed the expected cost of
punishment goes to 0 as T →∞(and δ → 1). For this type of “review strategies”
to work, player i must be kept from learning the likelihood of punishment within
each T period review phase. Condition (2) guarantees that such learning is not
happening.
It is also possible to use player i with λi < 0 who can be secretly screened at a.
In this case, player i’s incentive needs to be provided through rewards rather than
punishments. This extension is discussed in the last section.
4 Folk Theorem with Delayed Communication
To prove a folk theorem, T-public equilibrium is employed as in Compte [6] and
Kandori and Matsushima [11]. In T-public equilibrium, players reveal their private
signals publicly only every T periods.10 Player i’s action strategy σa
i depends on
9Player i’s incentive for truthful announcements is not an issue in Compte [6] because he uses
a slightly stroger version of Assumption 1 (for Theorem 1): player j’s deviation can be detected
from s−i,j for any i 6= j rather than s−j (note that this requires three players). Then xj can be
just a function of s−i,j,t h u sp l a y e ri does not have an incentive to manipulate player j
0s transfer.
In this case, qi does not need to depend on si, hence (1) can be replaced by E [qi (s−i)|a] <
E [qi (s−i)|a
0
i,a −i] for all a
0
i 6= ai. Therefore there is no incentive problem regarding announcements
in Compte [6] because neither xj nor qi does not depend on si.
10This can be interpreted as players announcing meaningless random messages until the end of
each T-period block. Note also that player i’s message space needs to be at least as large as S
T
i .
7only such publicly announced private signals. Player i’s report strategy σm
i depends
on public signals as well as her private history within the most recent T-period
block. Let E (δ,T)b et h es e to fa l lT-public equilibrium payoﬀsg i v e nδ. A T-public
equilibrium in which players play the same action every period within each T-period
block is called a stationary T-public equilibrium.
A few more notations need to be introduced to state the theorem. Let Λ =
{λ ∈<n|kλk =1 } be the space of utility weights. Let Aτ (λ) ⊂ A be the subset of
pure action proﬁles where there exists at least one informed player with a positive
weight larger than τ.T h i s τ can be an arbitrarily small positive number. Deﬁne
the following value for each λ ∈Λ,









Let Dτ (λ) ≡ {v ∈<n|λ · v ≤kτ (λ)}. I say a convex set in <n is full dimensional if
it has an interior point in <n.
Theorem 1 Fix any τ > 0. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisﬁed and ∩λ∈ΛDτ (λ)
is full dimensional. Then, for any smooth set W in the interior of ∩λ∈ΛDτ (λ), there
exists δ ∈ (0,1) and an integer T such that W ⊂ E (δ,T) for all δ ∈ (δ,1).
Proof. See Appendix.
An immediate corollary of this theorem is the following Nash-threat folk theorem.
Corollary 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisﬁed and V NE is full dimensional.
Also suppose that every player is informed at every action proﬁle that achieves an
extreme point of V .T h e n ,f o ra n yv ∈ intV NE, there exists δ ∈ (0,1) and an integer
T such that v ∈ E (δ,T) for all δ ∈ (δ,1).
Proof. First note that V NE ⊂ limτ→0 ∩λ∈ΛDτ (λ). For each v ∈ intV NE. Pick
as m o o t hs e tW s.t. v ∈ W ⊂ intV NE. Then pick small enough τ > 0 such that
W ⊂ intDτ (λ) and apply the above theorem.
The proof of the theorem consists of two steps. The ﬁrst step is to transform
an inﬁnitely repeated game into a T-period game with side transfers. Consider
the best stationary T-period equilibrium in the direction of λ for this T-period
game. The equilibrium payoﬀ provides an upper bound of the best stationary T-
public equilibrium of the original inﬁnitely repeated game. It is well known that
this bound is indeed tight, i.e. the area surrounded by a collection of such bounds
indexed by λ is approximately the set of stationary T−public equilibrium payoﬀso f
the original inﬁnitely repeated game as δ → 1. In the second step, it is shown that
this area contains ∩λ∈ΛDτ (λ) for any τ > 0a sT →∞ .
8There is nothing new in the ﬁrst step. Here I brieﬂyc o p yt h er e s u l t sf r o mC o m p t e
[6]. Consider the following T-period game with side transfers: stage game G is played
T times and players announce their private signals mi =( si,1,...,s i,T),i=1 ,...,nat
the end of the T periods, on which their side transfers xi (m),i∈ I are based. Let
σ
a,T
i be player i0s T-period action strategy and σ
m,T
i be player i’s report strategy,












be player i’s T-period strategy. Player i’s payoﬀ from this






















1 − δT (3)





as player i’s average payoﬀ within the ﬁrst T periods
of the original inﬁnitely repeated game and xi (m) as the variation of continuation
payoﬀs.11
A T−period strategy proﬁle σT is called stationary if it speciﬁes the same
(mixed) action proﬁle every period and all private signals are announced truth-
fully at the end of the T periods. Player i’s stationary strategy with αi ∈ 4Ai
is denoted σT
















and σT (α) is a Nash equilibrium (called stationary T-period equilibrium), that is


















for any T-period strategy σT0
i and i ∈ I.
Note that σT (α) is just a Nash equilibrium, not necessarily a sequential equilibrium.
However, since full support is assumed, there exists an outcome equivalent sequential
equilibrium for any Nash equilibrium.
Now consider the following programming problem for each λ ∈Λ,
k(λ,δ0,T)= m a x
v,α,x,σT(α)
λ · v (4)







λi · xi (m),∀m ∈ ST,
11This can be more easily seen from the following transformation: xi (m)=
δT (vi(m)−vi)
1−δT , where
vi is player i’s discounted average payoﬀ and vi(m)i sp l a y e ri
0s discounted average continuation
payoﬀ given m.
9This problem characterizes the best stationary T-period equilibrium payoﬀso ft h e
T-period game in the direction of λ. Let k(λ,T)=l i m δ0→1 k(λ,δ0,T)a n dD(λ,T)=
{v|λ · v ≤k(λ,T)}.12 Then it turns out that almost all payoﬀsi n∩λ∈ΛD(λ,T)c a n
be supported by stationary T-public equilibria as δ → 1 in the original inﬁnitely
repeated game. The following proposition follows from Fudenberg and Levine [8]
and Lemma 2 in Compte [6].
Proposition 1 Suppose that ∩λ∈ΛD(λ,T) is full dimensional. For any smooth
set W in the interior of ∩λ∈ΛD(λ,T), there exists δ such that W ⊂ E (δ,T) for
all δ ∈ (δ,1)
Given this result, all I need is to show that ∩λ∈ΛD(λ,T)c o n t a i n s∩λ∈ΛDτ (λ)
as T →∞ . Thus the second step is to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisﬁed. For any ε > 0 and τ > 0, there
exists δ0 and T0 such that k
¡
λ,δ0,T0¢




Proof. See the appendix.
Here I just provide a rough sketch of this second step. Fix λ ∈Λ.I ti se a s yt o
show that Dτ (λ) ⊂ D(λ,T)w h e nkτ (λ)i sa c h i e v e db yα ∈ NE. There exists a T-
period equilibrium with zero transfer where α is played in every period. So suppose
that kτ (λ) is achieved by a non-Nash pure strategy proﬁle a ∈ Aτ (λ). Below I
construct transfers xi,i∈ I, for which σT (a)i sas t a t i o n a r yT−period equilibrium
and the eﬃciency loss is small (E
hP
j∈I λjxj (m)|σT (a)
i
≥− ε).
Let player i be an informed player at a with λi > τ. For j 6= i, since Assumption
1i ss a t i s ﬁed, there exists transfer xj that provides the incentive for player j to play
aj (by Lemma 1). Deﬁne xj (m)= 1
T
PT
t=1 xj (s−j,t). These transfers take care of
the incentive of player j 6= i.
To keep “the budget balanced”, e xi,j (m)=−
λj
λixj (m) is added to player i’s
transfer.13 Then player i may have incentive to deviate or send a false message to
manipulate xj (m),j 6= i. To address this problem, I follow Compte [6] to use the
following scheme. Private signal proﬁles (s1,...,s T)r e p o r t e di nt h ee n do ft h eT
periods are translated into T binary signals c =( c1,...,c T) ∈ {g,b}
T . The proba-
bility of ct = b at period t is given by some function qi (st). This is where a public
randomization device is used. Then player i is punished if and only if ct = b for
t =1 ,2,...,T. The sum of this punishment and
P
j6=i e xi,j (m)i st h et o t a ls i d e
transfer for player i.
12Note that k(λ,δ0,T) is monotonically increasing in δ0.
13T h er o l eo fτ > 0i st oo b t a i nal o w e rb o u n df o rλi, which provides an upper bound for these
transfers.
10Since player i can be secretly screened, this qi can satisfy (1) and (2). The ﬁrst
condition (1) guarantees that any deviation by player i increases the probability of
b in that period.
I like to make the expected probability of punishment as small as possible to
avoid eﬃciency losses. To meet this goal, ﬁrst I single out the binding incentive
constraint out of many incentive constraints. If player i can learn the likelihood of
her punishment from her private information, then the binding incentive constraint
can be with respect to a very complicated contingent deviation. The second con-
dition (2) is useful here to exclude this possibility: such learning does not occur in
equilibrium. Then it turns out that the binding constraint is with respect to the
one-period deviation in the ﬁrst period as in Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce [1]. Note
that the deviation gain from such one-period deviation is in the order of 1
T compared
to the total payoﬀ of the T-period game. Since the expected cost of punishment
(E [xi (m)] < 0) is in the same order, it becomes negligible as T →∞ . This is why
E
hP
j∈I λjxj (m)|σT (a)
i
can be made arbitrarily small and kτ (λ) is approximately
achieved for the problem (4) by a stationary T-period equilibrium as T →∞ .
5 Discussion
The above theorem may not apply to the two-player example in Section 3. Suppose




Since player 1 is not an informed player at (D,C),A τ (λ) does not contain (D,C)
when λ1 > 0a n dλ2 < τ. Hence Dτ (λ) needs to be deﬁned with respect to the Nash
equilibrium (D,D)( i . e . Dτ (λ) ≡ {(v1,v 2)|λ · v ≤0})f o rs u c hλ.T h e n c l e a r l y
∩λ∈ΛDτ (λ) does not cover the individually rational and feasible payoﬀ set (in fact
it coincides with (0,0)!).
However, the folk theorem can be still proved for this game by extending The-
orem 1. It is possible to support (D,C) in the following way. Since D is the best
response at (D,C), player 1’s incentive is satisﬁed without any transfer. Player 2’s
incentive to cooperate can be provided through rewards when λ2 < 0.14 Remember
that transfers must satisfy 0 ≥
P2
i=1 λi·xi (m), hence x2 (m)m u s tb ep o s i t i v eg i v e n
x1 (m)=0a n dλ2 < 0.
How large can k(λ,δ0,T)b ew h e nλ1 > 0a n dλ2 < 0? Since x2 (m) ≥ 0f o r
any m, player 2’s payoﬀ is at least as large as maxa2 g2 (D,a2)=0 . Thus k(λ,δ0,T)
14For λ2 ∈ [0,τ), player 2’s incentive is still provided through punishments. The lower bound of
positive λ2 was used to limit the size of transfers (from player 1 to player 2, in this case) in the
proof of Theorem 1. This bound is not relevant in this case because no transfer from playe 1 is
needed.
11c a nb ea tm o s tλ1g1 (D,C)+λ2g2 (D,D)=2 λ1. T h el e m m ab e l o wp r o v e st h a ti ti s
possible to approximate this level of k by making the expected reward given (D,D)
almost negligible as T →∞ .T h e nD(λ)={v|λ · v ≤2λ1} for such λ, which still
covers all the individually rational and feasible payoﬀs, can be approximated when
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 < 0.
More generally, let A0 ⊂ A be the subset of action proﬁles where every player
is either informed or playing a best response action. For each a ∈ A0 and λ ∈Λ,
let I (a,λ) be the set of informed players with a negative weight. Deﬁne k0 (a,λ) ≡ P
i∈I/I(a,λ) λigi (a)+
P
i∈I(a,λ) λi maxai gi (ai,a −i). Then k0 (a,λ) can approximated
by k(λ,δ0,T)a sT →∞and δ0 → 1.15
Lemma 4 For any ε > 0, there exists δ0 and T0 such that k(λ,δ,T0) >k 0 (a,λ)−ε




Proof. See the appendix.
This means that Theorem 1 holds even if Dτ (λ) ≡ {v ∈<n|λ · v ≤kτ (λ)} is
modiﬁed by redeﬁning kτ (λ)a sf o l l o w s :




λ · g(a), max
α∈NE




This folk theorem applies to the above prisoners’ dilemma example.
The proof of this lemma is slightly more complicated than the proof of Lemma
3 at one point. For Lemma 3, the binding constraint was with respect to the one
shot deviation in the ﬁrst period. This was because the marginal increase of the
probability of punishment increases as players deviate more from the equilibrium
action. When rewards are being used, the marginal decrease of the probability of
reward goes down as players deviate more. Therefore the most tempting deviation is
not the one shot deviation. In fact, it may be a very complicated deviation because
of learning.16 The proof of Lemma 4 involves ﬁnding an upper bound of expected
rewards without identifying the binding incentive constraint.
6A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1
Given Proposition 1, I just need to show that ∩λ∈ΛD(λ,T)c o n t a i n s∩λ∈ΛDτ (λ)
as T →∞uniformly in λ ∈Λ when Assumption 1 is satisﬁed. The following lemma
proves this step.
15See Compte [6] for a more detailed discussion for this expression.
16When no learning occurs, the binding constraint is with respect to deviations in every period
(Compte [6]).
12P r o o fo fL e m m a3
Proof. Pick any λ ∈Λ. If kτ (λ)=λ · g(α)f o rs o m eα ∈ NE (which is nec-
essarily the case when every element of λ is nonpositive), then kτ (λ)i st r i v i a l l y
achieved by a stationary T-period equilibrium with constant action α and 0 side
transfer. Let Λτ be the set of λ for which kτ (λ) is achieved by a non-Nash pure
strategy proﬁle aλ ∈ Aτ (λ). Let i ∈ I be the informed player with λi > τ at aλ. I
am going to ﬁnd side transfers and a stationary T-period equilibrium where players
always play aλ and announce their private signals truthfully.
To verify if a stationary T-period strategy is a stationary T-period equilibrium, I
just need to check all one-period deviation constraints (in action and/or announce-
ments) on and oﬀ the equilibrium path.17 Let’s start with j 6= i.F o rg i v e naλ, let









λixj (s−j,t) is sub-
tracted from player i’s transfer. For any T0, there exists δ0 such that the following
condition is satisﬁed for every aj 6= aλ


































T as δ → 1. This condition implies that player j’s incentive
constraint is satisﬁed period by period on and oﬀ the equilibrium path when xj (m)
is used as side transfers for player j in the end of T periods. Furthermore, this δ0 (T)
can be chosen uniformly with respect to λ ∈Λτ because there are only ﬁnite number
of action proﬁles and ﬁnite number of players.
Next I focus on the incentive of player i. First, the following expression charac-
terizes the maximum deviation gain of player i in each period, taking into account

























































bound can be found because λi is bounded below by τ > 0. Note also that, g(T)
17This does not guarantee that the strategy is a sequential equilibrium because it may not be
sequentially rational for a player to announce her signal truthfully immediately after deviating from
the equilibrium action. However, there always exists an outcome equivalent sequential equilibrium
for any Nash equilibrium because of the full support assumption.
13decreases roughly in the order of 1




Player i can be secretly screened by Lemma 2. Let qi : S → (0,1) be the function
to satisfy (1) and (2). Deﬁne a random variable c as explained in Section 4. Then
deﬁne e xi (m)a sf o l l o w s
e xi (m)=−4 when c(m)=( 1 ,...,1)
=0 o t h e r w i s e
where 4 > 0i st ob ec h o s e nl a t e r .P l a y e ri’s total transfer is deﬁned by the sum of





By Lemma 2, when player i deviates in action or in announcement in period t,






























≥ 4π × πT−1















with respect to all λ ∈ Λτ. This is strictly positive by Lemma 2. Note that (1) and
(2) guarantee that Pr(ct0 is b at t0 6= t|ht,h i,t)i sa tl e a s tπT−1 in the beginning of
any period t on and oﬀ the equilibrium path.
Since the gain from any one-period deviation (in action and/or announcement)
is at most g(T), all the one-period deviation constraints on and oﬀ the equilibrium
path are satisﬁed if
g (T) ≤ 4π × πT−1 ×4
is satisﬁed. Set 4 so that this inequality holds with equality. Since xj (m),j 6= i











eﬃciency loss on the equilibrium path - is λiπT4, which is at most g(T) π
4π from
the deﬁnition of 4 (note that ∀i,|λi| ≤ 1). This eﬃciency loss can be made smaller
than ε because g(T) can be made arbitrarily small by choosing large enough T0
(and large enough δ0). Notice that the same T0 and δ0 is being used for all λ ∈Λτ.
Hence, given ε > 0a n dτ > 0, there exist T0 and δ0 such that, for every λ ∈Λτ,



















>k τ (λ) − ε.
Therefore k(λ,δ,T0) ≥ k
¡
λ,δ0,T0¢





This Lemma proves that ∩λ∈ΛD(λ,T)c o n t a i n s∩λ∈ΛDτ (λ)a sT →∞uniformly
in λ ∈Λ, thus W is contained in the interior of ∩λ∈ΛD(λ,T)f o rl a r g ee n o u g hT.Fix
such T. Then Proposition 1 implies that there exists δ such that W is contained in
E (δ,T)f o ra n yδ ∈ (δ,1).¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a4
Proof. Fix ε > 0. Note that (1) best response actions can be supported without
any transfer and (2) the proof of Lemma 3 can be applied to informed players with
nonnegative weight. For (2), notice that no lower bound of the positive weight is
needed here because no transfer across diﬀerent players is involved. Hence I focus
on the incentive of informed players with negative weight in the following.
Pick any a ∈ A0, λ ∈Λ and pick any i ∈ I (a,λ). Consider a T-period game
with side transfers and a stationary T-period strategy where a is played for T-
periods. Since player i can be secretly screened by Lemma 2, there exists a function
qi : S → (0,1) that satisﬁes (1) and (2). As before, deﬁne a random variable c as
explained in Section 4. This time player i’s transfer is deﬁned by
xi (m)=4 when c(m)=( g,...,g)
=0 o t h e r w i s e
If 4 > 0 is large enough, it is optimal to play ai every period. 4 is chosen so
that one incentive constraint is binding. Let σT0 be the strategy with the binding




be the distribution on AT
i ×ST
i that is generated
when player i deviates to σT0





be the number of times player
i deviated from ai along T-period history hT
























15where gi (a)=m a x a0i gi (a0
i,a −i) − gi (a). The left hand side is larger because it is









































































where π = E [qi (s)|a]a n dπ0 satisﬁes π0 > π and π0 ≤ E [qi(s0
i,s −i)|a0
i,a −i,s i]f o r
any (s0
i,a 0
i) 6=( si,a i).




















































as δ0 → 1 by the theorem of Maximum. It is easy to show that this is maximized
at d = T. Therefore I can ﬁnd large enough
¡
T0,δ0¢
such that this bound is approx-
imately gi (a)+gi (a)=m a x a0i gi (a0
i,a −i). Clearly this approximation can be done
uniformly across every i ∈ I (a,λ), a ∈ A0, and λ ∈Λ.










is approximated within ε by a T-stationary equilibrium for every a ∈ A0 and




>k 0 (a,λ) − ε for every a ∈ A0, λ ∈Λ, and
R
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